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I. INTRODUCTION
During their first semester in law school, many students must read
Vaughan v. Menlove' and Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Company.2
Certainly, covering a span of ten years, Vaughan and Ryan were re-
quired reading in my torts course. Both cases present probative facts
and legal principles which are not terribly difficult. In Vaughan, a
boundary separated Menlove and Vaughan's homesteads. Vaughan
built cottages near the boundary. Later, Menlove decided to build a
hay rick near the divide. Insisting repeatedly that the rick would be a
fire hazard, Vaughan encouraged Menlove not to build the rick so
close to the boundary and cottages. Menlove ignored Vaughan's
warnings.3 In the course of events, extreme heat ignited the rick.
Flames spread to Menlove's barn and stables. Ultimately, the fire
reached Vaughan's cottages, which were destroyed.4
In Ryan, either the railroad company's "careless management" or
an "insufficient condition" in one of the company's engines caused
sparks from the engine to reach the company's woodshed. Flames
engulfed the structure. Ryan's house was located one hundred and
1. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.), 3 Bing. N.C. 468.
2. Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
3. Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491, 3 Bing. N.C. at 470-71.
4. Id. at 491, 3 Bing. N.C. at 469-70.
5. Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 210.
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thirty feet from the burning woodshed. Sparks spread to Ryan's
house and the fire destroyed the residence.6
Stated briefly, the facts in Vaughan presented a question of first
impression: whether a landowner has a duty to protect his neighbor's
property from risks created on the landowner's property. Citing in-
surance-law decisions, the Court of Common Pleas expanded the neg-
ligence doctrine and entered a judgment in favor of Vaughan. The
court concluded: A landowner must act like a reasonable person-
under the same or similar circumstances-and use his land without
damaging another person's property.' In Ryan, the New York Court
of Appeals cited and considered the standard of care ruling in
Vaughan. But, the Ryan court framed the question this way: "A
house in a populous city takes fire, through the negligence of the
owner or his servant; the flames extend to and destroy an adjacent
building . . . . Is the owner of the first building liable to the second
owner for the damage sustained by such burning?"'
To resolve the dispute, the court of appeals cited and applied the
familiar proximate cause doctrine: "[E]very person is liable for the
consequences of his . . . acts. . . . [Or stated slightly differently, every
person is] liable in damages for the proximate results of his own acts,
but not for remote damages."' Therefore, in light of the facts, the
New York Court of Appeals concluded that the railroad company was
not liable."o The court declared that the fire was the proximate cause
of the torched woodshed and its contents. But it was only the remote
cause of Ryan's loss."
A cursory review of reported decisions and law articles reveals an
unsurprising development: The respective standard-of-care and proxi-
mate-cause principles in Vaughan and Ryan explain why jurists and
commentators are significantly more likely to cite and/or critique
those opinions. On the other hand, some less-discussed facts and dicta
explain the Author's thirty-year fascination with Vaughan and Ryan.
6. Id.
7. Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 494, 3 Bing. N.C. at 476-77 ("Under the circum-
stances of the case it was proper to leave it to the jury whether with reference to the
caution which would have been observed by a man of ordinary prudence [Menlove]
had not been guilty of gross negligence. . . . The principle on which this action pro-
ceeds is by no means new. . . . The conduct of a prudent man has always been the
criterion for the jury in such cases: but it is by no means confined to them. In insur-
ance cases, where a captain has sold his vessel after damage too extensive for repairs,
the question has always been whether he had pursued the course which a prudent
man would have pursued under the same circumstance.").
8. Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 210.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 210-12.
11. Id. at 213. According to the court of appeals, one could reasonably anticipate
or expect the railroad company's woodshed to catch fire; however, Ryan's house
catching fire was "not a natural and expected result" of the burning woodshed. Id. at
212.
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In both cases, the courts discussed property insurance. More specifi-
cally, the two courts impliedly raised an extremely important question
without addressing it: whether an insurer must indemnify a negligent
property owner if the latter starts a fire on his property, which spreads
and destroys a third party's commercial or residential property.
Again, in Vaughan, Menlove's decision to build a hay rick on his
property increased substantially the probability of a fire. Over a pe-
riod of five weeks, he was warned repeatedly about the peril that he
was creating and encouraged to disassemble the rick. In response,
Menlove stated that "he would chance it" and accept the high likeli-
hood of a fire on his property. Why? Menlove's property or "his
stock was insured."1 2 Justice Vaughan took special note of Menlove's
confidence because Menlove reasonably concluded that his English
underwriter would indemnify him for the value of his fire-destroyed
property.13
Justice Hunt wrote for the majority in Ryan, concluding that the
railroad company was not liable for Ryan's fire-destroyed property.
To help reach that conclusion, Justice Hunt raised the question:
whether a careless property owner or his insurer must indemnify a
neighbor, if a fire spreads from the insured's property to the neigh-
bor's property and destroys the neighbor's property. The justice an-
swered the question this way:
A man may insure his own house or his own furniture, but he can-
not insure his neighbor's building or furniture, for the reason that
he has no interest in them. To hold that the owner must not only
meet his own loss by fire, but that he must guarantee the security of
his neighbors on both sides . .. [would create liabilities which would
destroy] all civilized society. . . . [However, if each person buys] in-
surance against such hazards, [he can obtain some] . . . reasonable
security against [his] loss. To neglect such precaution, and . . . call
upon his neighbor, on whose premises a fire originated, to indem-
nify him . . . would be . . . a punishment quite beyond the offense
committed.14
Between 2004 and 2011, the Author left scorching summers' tempera-
tures in South Texas for working vacations in Northern Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, and New Mexico. And each summer, the Author
witnessed (1) the devastating consequences of out-of-control pre-
12. Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491, 3 Bing. N.C. at 471.
13. Justice Vaughan in his concurring opinion noted that "every one [sic] takes
upon himself the duty of so dealing with his own property as not to injure the prop-
erty of others. . . . [W]hen the Defendant upon being warned as to the consequences
likely to ensue from the condition of the rick . . . he adverted to his interest in the
insurance office." Id. at 494, 3 Bing. N.C. at 477.
14. Ryan, 35 N.Y. at 216-17. Justice Hunt went on to posit that "if the negligent
party is liable to the owner of a remote [fire-consumed] building, . . . he would also be
liable to the insurance companies who should pay losses to such remote owners. The
principle of subrogation would entitle the companies to the benefit of every claim
held by the party to whom a loss should be paid. . . ." Id. at 217.
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scribed burns in the National Forests of Northern Arizona and East-
ern New Mexico, and (2) the financial and personal effects of
wildfires-brush, grass and prairie fires-in Southern California.15 In
very recent summers, the Author returned from his vacations only to
witness the widespread and cataclysmic aftermath of thousands of
wildfires in Texas.16 However, each time the Author observed wild-
fires in Texas or elsewhere, and saw the devastation in their wake, the
Author remembered Justices Vaughan and Hunt's insurance-law dicta
in Vaughan and Ryan, respectively.
But even more importantly, those wildfires have generated two in-
terrelated questions: (1) whether insurers have a duty to indemnify
residential and commercial property owners if a wild forest, brush,
grass, or prairie fire destroys homeowners' property in Texas, and (2)
whether insurers have a duty to pay or settle third-party claims in
Texas if a property owner starts a fire on her property, which evolves
into a wildfire and destroys a third party's residential or commercial
property. To be sure, Texas courts have a long tradition of deciding
whether fire insurers have a duty to indemnify commercial and resi-
dential property owners after on-the-premises fires destroy goods and
structures." And both insurers and property owners have won a fair
15. See M.P. McQueen, Where Wildfires Burn, Insurers Get Cold Feet: Homeown-
ers in Western U.S. Find Tougher Requirements, Fewer Options for Coverage, WALL.
ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at D1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121867195558
038891.html; see also Tamara Audi, Evacuations Continue as Arizona Fire Spreads,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2011, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052702304906004576369843152407046.html ("The so-called Wallow Fire, burning
across the eastern Arizona wilderness and the Apache National Forest, has grown to
233,000 acres since it started more than a week ago. The fire ... [is the] third-largest
in state history . . . . Officials in neighboring New Mexico braced . . . for the fire to
cross into their state.").
16. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Texas Fires Destroy 500 Homes: Scores of Blazes
Rage Across Central and Eastern Parts of the Drought-Stricken State, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2011, at AA1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/06/nation/la-na-
texas-wildfires-20110906.
17. Compare Ginners' Mut. Underwriters of San Angelo, Texas v. Wiley & House,
147 S.W. 629, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1912, writ ref'd) (holding that the insurer
had a duty to indemnify a small business for a fire loss), and Delaware Ins. Co. of
Philadelphia v. Hill, 127 S.W. 283, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1910, writ ref'd)
(holding that the insurer had a duty to indemnify a partnership for a fire loss), and
Orient Ins. Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 38 S.W. 60, 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1896, writ ref'd) (declaring that the fire insurer had a duty to indemnify the small
business), with Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. McMinn, 188 S.W. 25, 26 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1916, no writ) (concluding that the insurer had no duty to indem-
nify the small business for a fire loss), and Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Sadau, 167
S.W. 334, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914, no writ) (holding that the insurer had
no duty to indemnify a homeowner for a fire loss), and Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. J.W.
Caraway & Co., 130 S.W. 458, 460-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1910, no writ)
(concluding that the property insurer had no duty to indemnify the corporation for a
fire loss).
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share of those decisions." Still, the two questions posed above are
not simply academic.
As of this writing, various courts in California have resolved a num-
ber of disputes over whether insurers must reimburse property owners
after wildfires destroyed insureds' goods and structures.1 9 Also, in
very recent years, the Fifth Circuit has addressed and settled several
controversies over whether insurers have a duty to indemnify after
tropical storms destroyed commercial and residential property in
Texas.2 0 Insurers and insurance consumers, however, have not asked
Texas's courts to address the specific questions appearing above or to
resolve a more general dispute: whether insurers must pay or settle
first- and third-party, wildfire-loss claims. In light of the large num-
bers of wildfires that have destroyed commercial and residential struc-
tures and properties in Texas recently, these types of disputes are
likely to appear more frequently in Texas's courts and in the federal
district courts located in Texas.
Therefore, this essay has two purposes. First, it is designed to high-
light some of the issues and principles that have influenced historically
whether state and federal courts will order property insurers to indem-
nify insureds after a fire destroys the latter's commercial and/or resi-
dential property. The second purpose is to find a plausible answer to
the implied, duty-to-pay question that appears in Ryan v. New York
Central R.R. Company: whether liability insurers must pay proceeds to
cover third-party, fire-loss claims, if a fire (1) ignites on an insured's
property, (2) spreads, (3) evolves into a "wildfire," and (4) eviscerates
third-party claimants' structures and personalty.
Necessarily, to achieve these ends, Part II discusses briefly the im-
portant distinction between insurers' obligations under first- and
third-party insurance contracts. Part III discusses several legal issues
which have shaped courts' duty-to-indemnify ruling, involving: (1)
whether insureds' requests for "additional living expenses" were legit-
imate, and (2) whether property insurers must pay to the "replace-
ment value" rather than the "actual cash value" of fire eviscerated
property. Quite simply, these issues have produced diverse rulings in
18. See cases cited supra note 17.
19. See generally Mahnke v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); Scally v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Daven-
port v. Nat'l Reserve Ins. Co., 267 P. 132 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
20. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Review of
2007-2008 Insurance Decisions, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1013, 1036-40 (2009). See also
Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2004-2005 Disposition of
Insurance Decisions: A Survey and Statistical Review, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 821,
850-58 (2006); John Tedesco, Tropical Storm Makes Waves, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-
NEWS, June 6, 2001, at 1A, available at 2001 WLNR 11972334 ("The first tropi-
cal storm of the season was churning off the coast of Texas and Louisiana ... packing
heavy rain and wind gusts clocked at more than 60 mph. Tropical Storm Allison ...
prompt[ed] forecasters to warn of flash floods.").
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Texas courts as well as in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
And those rulings are likely to have a bearing on whether property
insurers or insureds will prevail in any insurance-related, duty-to-in-
demnify litigation involving losses from wildfires.
Part IV addresses the general question: whether a property owner's
liability insurer has a duty to reimburse a third party if a fire spreads
from the owner's property to the third party's property and destroys
personalty and structures. Of course, as this essay discloses, courts
beyond Texas are seriously divided over (1) whether liability insurers
must pay third-party claims on behalf of insureds if the latter's "pre-
scribed fires" escape from designated boundaries and burn third par-
ties' properties, and (2) whether liability insurers must defend insureds
and pay third-party claims on behalf of insureds if: (a) the latter start
fires on their property, and (b) the fires spread and destroy third par-
ties' residential and commercial properties.
Finally, Part V presents the results of a case study. Briefly put, the
Author searched all law-related, electronic databases and reporters-
looking for cases in which courts resolved fire-loss-compensation dis-
putes between insureds and their insurers. Among others, the follow-
ing empirical questions influenced the Author's decision to conduct
the study: (1) whether insurers or property owners are more likely to
win duty-to-indemnify, fire-loss disputes in state and federal courts;
(2) whether property owners' theories of recovery influence courts'
decision to resolve duty-to-indemnify disputes in favor of fire insurers
or property owners; (3) whether residential or commercial property
owners are more likely to prevail against insurers; and (4) whether
certain affirmative defenses increase or decrease fire insurers' likeli-
hood of winning duty-to-indemnify disagreements. Part VI answers
these questions.
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSURERS' OBLIGATIONS UNDER
FIRST-PARTY AND THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. Property Insurance Contracts and the Scope of Insurers' Duty to
Indemnity First-Party Claimants
Generally, first-party insurance covers an insured's person, person-
alty, and/or real property.21 Life, health, homeowners', theft, busi-
ness, fire, and property insurance agreements are familiar first-party
insurance contracts. But, it must be stressed: The definition of cover-
age under, say, a property insurance contract varies considerably from
an insurance consumer's fairly commonsensical or ordinary definition
21. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Jim Stephenson Motor Co., No. 05-94-00858-CV,
1996 WL 135688, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 26, 1996, writ denied) (not desig-
nated for publication) (observing that jurists define first-party insurance as coverage
for "the insured's own property or person" and citing various passages in insur-
ance dictionaries and glossaries).
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of coverage. To illustrate, under a first-party, property insurance
agreement, an insurer covers a loss only if a "listed peril" in the con-
tract causes a loss.22 Conversely, a property insurer has no duty to
cover a loss if an "excluded peril" is the efficient proximate cause of
the destruction.23
Second, fairly often, a duty-to-indemnify provision appears in first-
party, property insurance contracts. The typical clause states that the
insurer will indemnify an insured when the latter uses out-of-pocket
dollars to replace partially or totally destroyed, commercial or resi-
dential property. But it is important to stress: Under Texas's law, a
property insurer has a contractual duty to indemnify the insured if a
"covered peril" or "a peril insured against" destroys the insured's
property.24 On the other hand, a property insurer has no duty to in-
demnify if the insured does not file a property-loss claim "as soon as
practicable" and presents proof of a covered loss.25
Furthermore, it must be noted: Under Texas law, an in-
surer's duty to defend and a property insurer's duty to indemnify "are
distinct and separate duties."26 As discussed more extensively in the
following section, a liability insurer's duty to defend arises when an
alleged third-party victim's petition alleges facts that a liability insur-
ance contract could potentially cover. On the contrary, a property in-
22. See Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989,
writ denied) (stressing that one must determine if covered perils or excluded ones
produce losses before concluding that an insurer is liable under a property insurance
contract). See also Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 359 S.W.2d 203,
205-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that the destroyed
servant's house was "covered" at the time of loss, since the servant's occupancy or a
change in the occupancy "did not enhance the hazard of fire" and was not "directly or
indirectly responsible for the loss").
23. Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 527 ("In Texas, if one force is covered and one force
is excluded, the insured must show that the property damage was caused solely by the
insured force, or he must separate the damage caused by the insured peril from that
caused by the excluded peril." (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d
160, 162 (Tex. 1971))).
24. See Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 360 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1998, no pet.) (holding that "[p]roperty insurance is based on the principle of indem-
nity"); Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 480 S.W.2d 762, 765
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (concluding that "[a] contract provides
property insurance if it binds the insurer to indemnify the insured for loss of identifi-
able property described either specifically or by general language, such as property in
a certain place or within the possession of the insured").
25. Cf Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154, 157
(Tex. 1973) (requiring the insured to give notice "as soon as practicable [as] a condi-
tion precedent to liability" and concluding that "[i]n the absence of waiver or other
special circumstances, failure to perform the condition constitutes an absolute defense
to liability on the policy").
26. See Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex.
2004) (citing King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)). See
also Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997) (cit-
ing Am. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, writ dism'd)).
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surer's duty to indemnify generally arises after a trial on the merits,
and after adjudicated facts have established that a "covered peril"
caused the insured's loss. Or stated slightly differently, allegations in
an insured's pleading do not trigger a property insurer's duty to in-
demnify. The duty is triggered if a property insurance contract covers
a loss and the insured prevails on the merits in a trial.27
B. Liability Insurance Contracts and the Scope of Insurers' Duty to
Pay and Defend Insureds against Third-Party Claims
Quite simply, consumers purchase third-party insurance to cover
third-party victims' property-loss and/or "bodily injury" claims.2 8
Property owners can purchase third-party coverage under a "liability
insurance contract" and/or under an "indemnity insurance contract."2 9
Generally, third-party insurance is designed to help shield an insured
from having to pay out-of-pocket damages to a third-party victim.
Additionally, "[under a liability insurance contract], . . . the insurer's
obligation to pay arises as soon as the insured incurs liability for [a]
loss.""3 However, under an indemnity insurance contract, an insurer
is only required to reimburse the insured after the insured has paid or
been ordered to pay a third party's expenses.31
Liability insurance contracts have several familiar features: (1) a
coverage provision, outlining the types of risks that insurers have as-
sumed, (2) a broad exclusion clause, highlighting various exclusions
and limitations, (3) a right-to-settle clause, giving insurers the exclu-
sive right to settle all third-party claims, (4) a duty-to-defend provi-
sion, instructing liability insurers to hire legal counsel for the insureds'
27. See Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.
2007) (stating in certified question case that "[w]e do not reach the duty to indemnify
[issue] . . . as that duty is not triggered by allegations but rather by proof at trial").
28. Under this general heading, one finds a variety of automobile, homeowners',
professional-malpractice, general-business, commercial general liability, renter's, and
multi-peril policies. See Leon E. Wynter, Business & Race: Insurers Join the Effort to
Tackle Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1997, at B1 (reporting that so-called em-
ployee-practices liability insurance policies are spreading and, therefore, such develop-
ment "may place insurers in the role of watchdog for corporate behavior")
29. See MGM Grand Wins Award in Lawsuit on Las Vegas Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan.
23, 1985 ("MGM Grand Hotels said a federal judge ruled in its favor in the first of
three lawsuits between the company and its insurance carriers over the s ttlement of
claims from the 1980 fire at the MGM Grand Hotel. . . . [The federal judge] ordered
American Excess Insurance Company . .. to pay $4.7 million to cover legal fees and
other costs that MGM Grand incurred in defending more than 3,000 liability claims by
hotel guests from the fire, in which 84 people died. . . . American Excess previously
paid MGM Grand $10 million to cover claims by hotel guests specified by its indem-
nity policy.") (emphasis added).
30. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis
added).
31. See Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F.
Supp. 1426, 1432-33 (D. Colo. 1996). See also Little, 836 F.2d at 793 ("In general,
under an indemnity policy the insurer is obligated only to reimburse the insured for
covered loss that the insured himself has already paid.").
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benefit and pay defense costs, and (5) a duty-to-pay clause, outlining
the conditions under which insurers will pay after the insured's liabil-
ity has been established.3 2 Furthermore, a liability insurance contract
usually does not cover a third party's loss if an insured's intentional
act was the cause in fact and/or proximate cause of the loss.3 3 On the
other hand, if an insured's negligence caused the third-party injuries,
the liability insurer must pay insurance proceeds, settle the third
party's claim, or defend the insured against a third-party lawsuit.3 4
An insurer's duty to indemnify under a "true" indemnity insurance
contract is somewhat different than its obligation under a liability in-
surance contract. Under the former, an indemnity insurer must reim-
burse all expenses after the insured pays a third-party claimant.3 5
However, duty-to-defend clauses generally do not appear in indem-
nity insurance contracts. Instead, if the third party sues the insured,
the insured has exclusive authority to retain an attorney and control
the legal defense without securing the indemnity insurer's consent.3 6
And like liability insurance agreements, indemnity insurance contracts
do not cover an insured's allegedly malicious, dishonest, fraudulent,
libelous, or slanderous conduct.37 Finally, indemnity insurance agree-
ments appear in a variety of flavors.
32. See EMERIC FISCHER & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW,
app F, at F-3-16 (Matthew Bender ed., 2d ed. 1994). See also ALAN I. WIDISS, INSUR-
ANCE: MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND REGU-
LATORY ACTS, app. I, at 1133-47 (West ed., 1989); KENNETH H. YORK ET AL.,
GENERAL PRACTICE: INSURANCE LAW, app F at 867-75 (West ed., 3d ed. 1994).
33. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 358 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (observing that the liability insurance contract clearly ex-
cluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured").
34. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
35. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Lia-
bility Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A
Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judg-
ments-1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1146-47 nn.76-78 (1998) (comparing the
significant distinction between "true" indemnity insurance contracts and indemnity
provisions under liability contracts).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1147 ("Insurers sell several types of ... indemnity contracts: Professional
indemnity plans, hospital indemnity insurance, workers compensation indemnity
plans, excess-employers indemnity policies, and industrial indemnity insurance. Di-
rectors' and officers' policies, . . . however, appear to be the most widely distributed
and well-known type[s] of indemnity contracts.").
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III. TEXAS COURTS, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND CONFLICTING
RULINGS OVER WHETHER INSURERS MUST INDEMNIFY
INSUREDS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
AFTER FIRE LOSSES
A. Disputes over Whether Fire Insurers Must Pay Proceeds to
Cover Insureds' "Additional Living Expenses"
Normally, homeowners' insurance contracts contain an "additional
living expenses" provision.39 Quite simply, if a covered peril-a hurri-
cane, an earthquake, or a fire-makes a residential structure uninhab-
itable, property insurers will pay the increased costs associated with
the property owners' having to live temporarily elsewhere.40 How-
ever, fairly often, property insurers refuse to indemnify insureds for
the latter's increased living expenses. To illustrate, an earthquake de-
stroyed homes in California, forcing homeowners to spend money to
secure temporary shelter and other necessities.41 The insurer refused
to cover the additional living expenses; therefore, the insureds filed a
duty-to-indemnify action against he property insurer.4 2 In Texas, All-
state Insurance Company refused to pay many policyholders' addi-
tional living expenses after Hurricane Rita destroyed residential
property.4 3 In one instance, a disabled and displaced father needed
air conditioning because he could not live in the extreme heat and
39. See generally Purva Patel, Have Insurance Questions: Here Are Some An-
swers, CHRON.COM, (Sept. 28, 2008, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/business/real-
estate/article/Have-insurance-questions-Here-are-some-answers-1779472.php.
40. See Take Time to Review Fire Insurance, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at KI,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-31/realestate/re-51556 1_homeowners-
insurance-coverage ("An advantage of having a homeowners' policy over separate
polices for fire, theft and other perils is that a homeowners' policy will pay any addi-
tional living expenses-over and above normal expenditures-should the policy-
holder be forced by fire or other [perils] to temporarily live elsewhere.").
41. See generally Barry Stavro, Nader to Discuss State Earthquake Insurance Re-
form-Homeowners: Activist and Presidential Candidate Opposes California Commis-
sioner's Plan Limiting Damage Claims, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at B5, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-07-27/local/me-28633 1_insurance-reform ("20th Cen-
tury Insurance . . . has been a key target of consumer groups. The state Department of
Insurance launched an investigation into 138 open damage claims filed against 20th
Century . . . . All told, 20th Century was hit with 46,000 Northridge quake damage
claims, 36,000 of them from homeowners .... Of those 1,000 open cases, many are
disputes over additional living expenses . . . . About 200 lawsuits have been filed
against the company over unresolved quake claims. ).
42. Id.
43. See generally Purva Patel, Hurricane Rita: The Aftermath-Allstate Is Told to
Pay Living Expenses for Now, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2005, at Business 1, available at
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/2005_3909933/hurricane-rita-the-af-
termath-allstate-is-told-to-p.html ("Insurers generally pay policyholders' living ex-
penses if [the insureds must] live elsewhere while their homes are being repaired after
a disaster. But in this case, Allstate and the state disagree on what triggers the pay-
ments. In Texas, Allstate says it has never paid living expenses for those who evacu-
ate, unless homeowners can reasonably establish that their homes were directly
damaged and thus unlivable.").
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humidity after the hurricane. Furthermore, the father's son was autis-
tic; therefore, the latter's medicine needed refrigeration to prevent
spoilage.4 4 Still, in the wake of Rita, Allstate refused to cover those
temporary and additional living expenses. In response, the father, son
and many other affected homeowners sued Allstate and secured a
temporary injunction.4 5
Over the 2011 Labor Day weekend, "the costliest wildfire in Texas's
history" occurred in Bastrop, Texas.46  The raging fire consumed
"more than 1,500 homes and 34,000 acres" of pine forest.47 The wild-
fire-losses across Texas were projected to reach $500 million.48 Some
insurers compensated some homeowners for lost structures and con-
tents within twenty-four hours after the wildfires. However, the over-
whelming majority of insurers did not deliver additional living-
expenses checks to the burned-out property owners as readily.49 Typi-
cally, insurance adjusters promised only to cover insureds' increased
living costs at a later date.0
In California and other states, insureds have commenced legal ac-
tions against property insurers after the insurers refused to cover addi-
44. Id. ("One complaint came from a policyholder whose husband was disabled
and whose son had autism. The family needed the additional living expenses because
the husband couldn't live in extreme heat and his medication had to be
refrigerated.").
45. Id. ("Allstate customers who've had trouble collecting living expenses in the
aftermath of Hurricane Rita may soon find it easier to get paid . . . . Allstate denied
payments unless customers could prove damage, even though many were prohibited
by authorities from returning. But . . . a Travis County state district judge granted a
temporary restraining order barring Allstate from denying living expenses to those
policyholders.... In her order, state District Judge Darlene Byrne cited a case [stat-
ing] that . . . when policies . . . have more than one meaning, 'the policy will be
construed strictly against the insurer.'").
46. See Mike Ward, Fires Costliest in State's History, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Sept. 13, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.statesman.com/news/local/area-wildfires-
costliest-in-state-history-1850464.html?printArticle=y.
47. See Moritz Honert, Wildfires and Drought Cost Texas Billions -Millions of
Acres Burned, Thousands of Homes Lost, Chi. Trib., Sep. 13, 2011, at C3
48. Insured Losses from Bastrop, Texas, Wildfire Rise to $325M, INS. J. (Dec. 8,
2011), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2011/12/08/226681.htm.
49. Id. ("A majority of the homeowners ... received payments for the loss of their
home .. . The insurance industry was handing out checks the day after the fire to
homeowners who had lost everything,' said Mark Hanna, a spokesman for the Insur-
ance Council of Texas. 'The recovery process will simply take time as insurers con-
tinue to pay for additional living expenses (ALE) for homeowners who are either
rebuilding or seeking a new place to call home.'").
50. See Laylan Copelin, Lessons Learned the Hard Way, AUSTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, Sept. 13, 2011, at Al ("Javier and Carmen called their insurance company on
Sept. 5, the day after the wildfires started. Within an hour, Farmers Insurance wired
the first check -$900 for living expenses . . . . [F]ive days after the fires started, the
Chaparros met their adjuster [who] ... hands them two checks, a partial payment for
contents, plus the full policy amount for the structure.... [The adjuster promised that
more would] be coming for living expenses . . . .").
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tional living expenses." Like many displaced property owners who
filed legal actions, significant numbers of burned-out homeowners in
Texas are likely to file similar duty-to-indemnify lawsuits against some
of the same insurers.52 Certainly, disgruntled property owners have
already filed administrative complaints against insurers in Texas.5 3
Therefore, given the extreme likelihood of wildfire litigation in Texas
courts and in federal district courts, determining whether insureds or
insurers are more likely to win a majority of wildfire-litigation suits is
a timely and warranted exercise. Presently, courts in Texas are di-
vided over whether insurers must cover insureds' "increased living ex-
penses" in the wake of widespread fire- and hurricane-related
property losses.
To illustrate, consider the dispute in Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Glaze.5 4 Insured homeowners sued the insurer to secure reimburse-
ments for additional living expenses after a fire destroyed their house.
Beacon argued: A plain and ordinary reading of the relevant words
and phrases in the contract revealed that it had no duty to cover the
increased living expenses. But, the Tyler Court of Appeals disagreed
and forced the insurer to cover the additional costs." The appeals
court applied the doctrine of ambiguity, finding that the insurance
contract failed to state clearly whether the insurer had a duty to in-
demnify.5 6 The Tyler Court of Appeals embraced the trial court's
findings and declared: The language in the fire insurance policy-
when viewed in its entirety-could be construed as requiring the in-
sureds to keep detailed records or other documentation in order to
51. Cf Marc Lifsher, Wildfires Heat Up Debate on Rising Rebuilding Costs: Are
Policies Adequate to Help Make Homeowners Whole?, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at
Cl, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/06/business/fi-fires6 ("California
courts ... are backing insurance companies. In a recent case stemming from the 2003
Southern California wildfires, a panel of judges ... ruled that State Farm ... did not
misrepresent its coverage limits when it declined to pay full replacement value to a
San Bernardino woman, who lost her home. . . ."); M.P. McQueen, Where Wildfires
Burn, Insurers Get Cold Feet: Homeowners in Western U.S. Find Tougher Require-
ments, Fewer Options for Coverage, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at D1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121867195558038891.html ("[D]isputes between
homeowners and insurers over claims settlements from last year's wildfire season are
... continuing . . . . State officials received more than 512 complaints about claims
after the 2007 fires in Northern and Southern California . . . .").
52. Cf Top Local Stories of the Week, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 2012, at
B3 ("Wildfire suit 'resolved': A lawsuit filed against Bluebonnet Electric Cooperative
by people who lost their homes in the 2009 Wilderness Ridge wildfire was 'resolved'
... a Bluebonnet spokesman said. Up next are a dozen lawsuits over the 2011 Bas-
trop Complex Fire in Bastrop County.").
53. See, e.g., Insured Losses from Bastrop, supra note 48 ("From all of the wild-
fires in Texas this year, the Texas Department of Insurance has received . . . 11 . ..
complaints from homeowners who have run into problems with their insurance
companies.").
54. 114 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, pet. denied).
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 4 (reasserting that an insurance contract is "ambiguous" when it is rea-
sonably susceptible to more than one meaning).
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receive additional-living-expenses funds. Or the words and phrases
could be construed to cover additional living expenses if the insureds
presented only oral testimony."
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Thomas," a different court of
appeals reached the same conclusion. A fire totally destroyed the
Thomases' house and the contents. The losses were $375,000 and
$162,000, respectively. The property insurer paid sufficient funds to
rebuild the dwelling and to restore the contents. However, Common-
wealth refused to pay the homeowners' increased living costs.5 9 To
defend itself, the insurer asserted that the Thomases did not produce
any evidence of their pre-fire living expenses; therefore, the insured
were effectively precluded from establishing conclusively their "in-
creased living expenses" after the fire. Put simply, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals rejected Commonwealth's argument. The court
concluded: The Thomases only had to establish-by a preponderance
of the evidence-their necessary and reasonable living expenses after
the fire. Consequently, the insurer had to pay sufficient proceeds to
increase the Thomases' likelihood of returning to their "normal stan-
dard of living" before the fire.6 0
In Fidelity-Southern Fire Ins. Co. v. G. G. Whitman,6 1 the Houston
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District reached a different con-
clusion. The relevant facts are not terribly complex. A fire damaged
Whitman's house and its contents. Following customary practices, the
insurer sent an agent to investigate the loss. Whitman and the agent
discussed the various losses. Shortly thereafter, the agent delivered a
$5,500 check to Whitman's mortgagee and contractors to cover the
structural damage to the house.6 2 The agent also delivered a $1,220
check to Whitman. Based on the insurance adjuster's oral representa-
tions, Whitman concluded that $1,000 was compensation to replace
the contents of the house and $200 was partial compensation to cover
the insured's increased living expenses.6 3 In the end, Whitman signed
a full release, continuing to rely on the agent's oral representations
57. Id. See also Mobile Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The El Paso Court of Appeals also embraced
the jury's findings, applied the doctrine of ambiguity and declared that the insurer has
a duty to pay $600 to cover the insureds' additional living expenses after a fire de-
stroyed their house. Id. at 913.
58. 678 S.W.2d 278, 291 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Id., at 290
60. Id. at 290-91 ("It is undisputed that the Thomases' [sic] standard of living was
high, as were their living expenses before the fire . . . . [W]e hold there was . . .
sufficient evidence to require the submission of [the increased living expenses issue]
to the jury and to support its finding thereon.")
61. See 422 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
62. Id. at 554.
63. Id. at 553-54.
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and believing that the insurer would pay the entire amount to cover
his additional livings costs.
In the course of events, the insurer refused to pay any amount
above the $220. Whitman sued the insurer. A jury found that the $220
was only a partial payment for the insured's increased costs. Ulti-
mately, the Houston Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the
signed agreement was a totally integrated and binding full release.
Therefore, the insurer had no obligation to pay any additional pro-
ceeds to cover Whitman's post-fire living expenses. To help reach that
conclusion, the Houston Court of Appeals applied the doctrines of
ambiguity and plain meaning as well as the parol evidence rule. The
latter rule prevented the insurance agent's questionable oral represen-
tations from contradicting or altering the terms of the release
agreement.6 4
Also, as reported earlier, Texas courts are a split over whether in-
surers must pay homeowners' increased living expenses after a hurri-
cane destroys residential property and forces displaced insureds to live
elsewhere temporarily. In Temcharoen v. United Fire Lloyds,65 the
homeowners were victims of Hurricane Rita. The massive storm dam-
aged their house. The insureds sued the insurer who refused to cover
the insureds' additional living expenses.66 United Fire Lloyds filed a
traditional motion for summary judgment, claiming that the policy was
void because one of the insureds submitted bogus "receipts" for addi-
tional living expenses.
Finding that the anti-technicality statute-Tex. Ins. Code
Ann. § 705.003 (Vernon 2009) -did not apply and that the insured
had made a fraudulent statement, the trial court granted United Fire
Lloyds's motion.67 Put simply, the Eastland Court of Appeals cited
language in the insurance contract and concluded that section
705.003 was not applicable, that United Fire Lloyds did not meet the
requirements of section 705.003(b), and that there were unresolved
questions of fact. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment in favor of United Fire Lloyds and remanded the
cases for a trial on the merits.6 8
64. Id. at 557 ("The acceptance of the check and its endorsement constituted a full
settlement and release of all claims arising out of fire damage to personal prop-
erty and additional living expense. It is unambiguous. . . . [The introduction of the
agent's oral representation] that the check was 'only in partial payment of the losses'
[violated] the parol evidence rule.").
65. 293 S.W.3d 332, 333 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, pet. denied).
66. Id. at 333-34 ("[The homeowners sued the insurer] for breach of contract ....
They alleged that United Fire Lloyds failed to completely pay for damages they in-
curred as a result of Hurricane Rita. The homeowner's policy covered damage to
the house, and in an endorsement, [the insurer] also agreed to reimburse the
Temcharoens for [their] additional living expenses .....
67. Id. at 334.
68. Id.
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Then again, when Hurricane Carla destroyed a different set of in-
sureds' property, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals did not award
damages to cover the insureds' increased living costs. In Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Christianson,69 a jury found that Hurricane Carla made the
insureds' house uninhabitable. The jury also found that $1,800 was
"the reasonable and necessary" compensation to cover the increased
living expenses in Carla's wake."o Without a doubt, the insurance con-
tract required the insurer to pay the insureds' additional living ex-
penses." Still, the insurer insisted that the jury's answers were based
on insufficient evidence. The appellate court concluded that the jury's
findings were based on speculation, which essentially "varied and al-
tered the terms of the contract by adding language and conditions."72
Consequently, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reformed the trial
court's judgment, concluding that the $1,800 additional-living-ex-
penses award was inappropriate.
B. Conflicts over Whether Insurers' Must Pay Sufficient Proceeds to
Cover the "Actual Cash Value" or the "Replacement
Value" of Insureds' Fire Eviscerated Property
As of this writing, some victims of Texas's wildfires have begun to
rebuild their residences and commercial establishments. Rebuilding is
proceeding at a modest pace, because many of those persons' proper-
ties were insured against the risk of fire.7 3 But, in the wake of major
disasters, one question arises frequently when victims are deciding to
rebuild their partially or totally destroyed residential or commercial
structures: whether property insurers must pay the replacement value
of a new structure or the actual cash value of the old property before a
covered peril vaporized it.
Without doubt, property insurance contracts vary. Generally, a "re-
placement costs policy" requires an insurer to replace a structure
within a preset limit. Conversely, an "actual cash value policy" only
requires an insurer to pay enough money to rebuild a destroyed com-
mercial or residential property after deducting the depreciation
69. 395 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 61-62.
71. See id. at 62. The "additional living expenses" provision read in pertinent part:
Coverage D: If loss . . . renders the described dwelling or appurtenant pri-
vate structures untenantable, this Company agrees to pay the necessary and
reasonable increase in expenses in conducting the Insured's household ...
caused by such untenantability. Loss under Coverage D shall be computed
commencing with the date of loss and extending for, but not exceeding, the
time required with due diligence and dispatch to repair or replace the prop-
erty damaged or destroyed. Id. (emphases added).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Insured Losses from Bastrop, Texas, supra note 48. "More than half
of the homeowner insurance claims have been settled in the Bastrop (Texas) Complex
Wildfire . .. . The final tally for insured losses from the wildfire is projected to hit $325
million from the destructions of 1,673 homes." Id. (alteration in original).
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value.7 4 But consider the following "replacement cost" provision,
which appears in standard property insurance contracts:
When replacement cost is shown on the "declarations" for covered
property, the value of covered property will be based upon the re-
placement cost without any deduction for depreciation .... You"
may make a claim for actual cash value before repair or replace-
ment takes place, and later for replacement cost if "you" notify "us"
of your "intent" within 180 days after the loss.5
In light of the italicized phrases, reconsider the previous question
arise: Does an insurance contract require an insurer to pay a new
structure's replacement costs or its actual cash value before it was de-
stroyed? Arguably, the language is ambiguous. Therefore, as wildfire
litigation increases in Texas, property owners and their insurers are
likely to ask courts to declare whether such language requires insurers
to pay replacement prices or the cash value of a destroyed structure.
Certainly, both insurers and insured should be concerned: This ques-
tion has produced conflicting and even confusing rulings among
Texas's courts of appeals.76
Also wildfire litigants and their attorneys need to be cognizant of
the following. Typically, insured property owners must satisfy several
conditions precedent, even if their insurers have a contractual duty to
pay a fire-damaged property's repair costs or a fire-eviscerated struc-
ture's replacement costs. Property owners must repair or replace a
damaged structure before an insurer will pay repair or replacement
74. See Purva Patel, Rebuilding to Cost Homeowners More: Higher Supply, Labor
Expenses May Outstrip Limits of Insurance Policies, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2008, at
Business 1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/2008_46379
50/rebuilding-to-cost-homeowners-more-higher-supply-.html. See also Travelers In-
dem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 1982).
75. Fitzhugh 25 Partners v. KILN Syndicate KLN 501, 261 S.W.3d 861, 862 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (emphases added).
76. Compare St. Paul Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Fong Chun Huang, 808 S.W.2d 524, 528
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (concluding that the ac-
tual cash value rather than repair or replacement value is the correct measure of in-
surance compensation after a fire loss), and Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Eggleston,
357 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, no writ) (ruling against the
insured because the insured did not establish the reasonable repair costs by showing
the difference in the property's actual cash values before and after the damage), with
Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 278, 293 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowing a recovery for fire damage based upon replacements costs
rather than on the actual cash value of a property before the fire), and Commercial
Ins. Co. v. Colvert, 425 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ)
(using the same damage calculation as the one used in Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins.
Co. v. Thomas), and Farmers Mut. Protective Ass'n v. Cmerek, 404 S.W.2d 599, 600
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, no writ) (using the same damage calculation as the
prior two cases), and Lerman v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 382 S.W.2d 285,
288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (using the same damage calcula-
tion as the prior three cases), and Gulf Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 330 S.W.2d 227, 233 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1959, no writ) (using the same damage calculation as the prior four
cases).
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costs." Furthermore, the rebuilding or replacement must occur
within a definite period.8 In addition, insureds must (1) make repairs
or rebuild on the "same site," (2) use the repaired or replaced struc-
ture for the "same purpose," and (3) repair or replace the damaged
structure with "similar materials."7 9 Courts, however, are divided
over whether various types of replaced properties are "functionally
similar" or "comparable" to the destroyed properties.0
IV. TEXAS COURTS' CONFLICTING RULINGS OVER WHETHER
LIABILITY INSURERS MUST DEFEND INSUREDS AGAINST THIRD-
PARTY FIRE-Loss CLAIMS AND PAY DAMAGES
A. Third-Party Property Losses and the Scope of an Insurer's Duty
to Defend
Assume that an insured's negligence caused a fire, which totally or
partially destroyed a third party's property. Now, assume that the
complainant sues both the insured and the latter's liability insurer be-
cause neither has covered the loss. At that point, the insurer must
decide whether to defend the negligent insured against the third
party's lawsuit. Making a sound decision is not easy because liability
insurers have several options. An underwriter may (1) refuse to pro-
vide a legal defense for the negligent insured, (2) file a declaratory-
judgment action to determine whether it has a duty to defend, (3) de-
fend the insured under a reservation of rights or a non-waiver agree-
ment, or 4) defend the insured completely and unconditionally.
To determine whether a liability insurer must defend a negligent
insured, Texas's courts apply the "eight corners" rule or the com-
plaint-allegation rule: A court must review the allegations in the third
party's complaint, without trying to determine the truth or falsity of
77. See Fitzhugh 25 Partners, 261 S.W.3d at 865 (embracing the universal proposi-
tion that insurers are not obligated to indemnify before insureds repair or replace
their destroyed properties).
78. See Patel, supra note 74 ("Most insurers give homeowners about a year to
rebuild before they make full payments . . . . State Farm gives policyholders two years
to recover replacement costs.").
79. See Southland Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Cantu, No. 04-09-00705-CV, 2011 WL
1158244, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. filed). The insurer required those
conditions to be satisfied before it would pay to repair a hail-damaged roof. Id. See
also Garcia v. State Farm Lloyds, 287 S.W.3d 809, 822 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2009, pet. denied). Here, the insurer required those same conditions to be satisfied
before paying for mold remediation. Id.
80. Compare Fitzhugh 25 Partners, 261 S.W.3d at 865 (concluding that the insurer
had no duty to indemnify because the replaced office park was functionally dissimilar
to the destroyed apartment complex), with Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-
Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tex. 2004) (declaring that the insurer had a duty to
indemnify, since the insured mall's newly installed mechanical roof was comparable to
the mall's hail-destroyed, stone-ballasted roof).
81. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the allegations.8 2 If a provision in the insurance contract reasonably
or potentially covers the allegations, the liability insurer has a duty to
defend." "Even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent,
the insurer must [defend the insured]."8 4 The general rule is clear: If
any ambiguity exists about whether a liability insurer must defend an
insured, Texas's courts must resolve all doubts by ruling in favor of the
insured."
The scope of liability insurers' duty to defend is not terribly compli-
cated. Insurers must hire competent lawyers to represent he insureds
as well as pay all defense and court costs. An insurer's duty to defend,
however, is broader than and very unlike the carrier's duty to indem-
nify.86 For example, assuming that an insured pays out-of-pocket
damages to cover a third party's destroyed property, an insurer may
have a duty to defend the insured without having a concomitant obli-
gation to indemnify the insured." On the other hand, the "eight cor-
ners" doctrine also leaves open the possibility that a liability insurer
will indemnify voluntarily or involuntarily the third-party victim.
An insurer might indemnify a third party for a fairly obvious rea-
son: If a liability insurer defends an insured and the third party wins,
the insurer has a contractual obligation to pay damages to repair or
replace the third party's destroyed property.8 9 Another reason, how-
ever, is not as readily apparent: Consumers purchase liability insur-
82. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308
(Tex. 2006).
83. See Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tex.
1965) ("Where the complaint does not state facts sufficient to clearly bring the case
within or without the coverage, the general rule is that the insurer is obligated to
defend if there is, potentially, a case under the complaint within the coverage of the
policy." (quoting C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Allegations in Third Person's Action
Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend, 50 A.L.R.2d 458,
at 504 (1956))).
84. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008).
85. See, e.g., King v. Dall. Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002).
86. Id.
87. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997).
88. See Dall. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Sabic Ams., Inc., 355 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). See also Henson v. Am. Eagle Ins. Co., 832
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no pet.) ("Joe Best sued Henson ...
for damaging his aircraft . . . . Since American Eagle failed to provide Henson a
defense in the original suit, Henson [sent a formal demand to] American Eagle ...
advising them that they had sixty days to . . . provide a legal defense . . .
and pay any damages and court costs arising out of [the underlying third-party
lawsuit].").
89. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 268 S.W.3d 506, 507 (Tex. 2008)
("Samsung ... was sued in five putative class action lawsuits .... Samsung tendered
the defense of these cases to Federal, from which Samsung had purchased several
commercial general liability insurance policies and excess liability policies . . . . The
relevant policies covered 'damages the insured becomes legally obligated to pay' . . ..
Federal agreed to defend all of the cases except [one]. . . . The trial court [held] that
Federal had no duty to defend Samsung in the five case. . . . [W]e conclude that
Federal has a duty to defend Samsung [against four of the five lawsuits].").
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ance contracts willingly and compulsorily. And unlike first-party
property insurance, liability insurance is often called "third-party in-
surance." The name is proper because third-party victims are the in-
tended beneficiaries when insurers defend insureds and pay proceeds
under the terms of liability insurance contracts.9 0
B. "Prescribed Fires," "Hostile Fires," Third-Party Losses, and
Judicial Conflicts over Whether Liability Insurers Must
Defend and/or Indemnify Insureds
Generally, in Texas, property insurers are liable only if a "hostile
fire" rather than a "friendly fire" completely or partially eviscerates
an insured's property.9 1 Put simply, a fire is "friendly" if it remains in
an intended receptacle or place.9 2 Conversely, if a fire escapes and
burns an unintended object or burns in an unintended location, it be-
comes a "hostile fire."93 But these definitions generate two questions:
(1) whether a liability insurer must defend an insured if the insured's
"friendly" prescribed burn or fire becomes uncontrollable, spreads
and consumes third parties' structures and personal property; and (2)
whether a liability insurer must indemnify third-party victims if an in-
sured's "hostile fire" spreads and destroys third parties' property.
Arguably, fairly soon, negligent persons who start wildfires in
Texas, the presumed tortfeasors' liability insurers, and residential and
commercial victims are likely to file a number of declaratory-judg-
ment actions and raise these and related questions. However, based
on a few reported decisions, Texas's courts are likely to give conflict-
ing answers. When addressing these questions, courts have ruled in
favor of both insureds and liability insurers. Of course, courts have
given various explanations of their diverse rulings, looking beyond the
probative facts in the cases. As a consequence, traumatized third-
party property owners-the intended beneficiaries of liability insur-
ance- have a mixed history of receiving compensation to repair or
replace their totally or partially fire-destroyed residential and com-
mercial buildings. To illustrate, compare the relevant facts and rulings
90. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sink, 107 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex.
2003) (reiterating that third-party victims are treated as beneficiaries under liability-
insurance agreements if insureds are legally responsible for third-party victims' inju-
ries or losses). See also Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770,
775 (Tex. 1983) (emphasizing that third-party victims are the intended beneficiaries
under liability insurance contracts).
91. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 6 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1928); Garfield Mut.
Fire & Storm Ins. Ass'n v. Calhoun, 532 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ).
92. See City of New York Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim, 7 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1928, no writ).
93. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
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in Spruiell v. Lincoln Ins. Co.94and Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe
Tire Disposal Corp.9 5 with those in E & L Chipping Co. v. Hanover
Ins. Co.96
In Spruiell, the insured-Michael McKean-owned and operated a
cafe and grill. The business was located in a section of a leased build-
ing. McKean purchased a commercial general liability insurance con-
tract from Lincoln Insurance Company. Spruiell's Automotive shared
an adjoining firewall with the cafe. One fateful night, a fire destroyed
the cafe and heavily damaged Spruiell's business. Twenty months
later, Spruiell sued McKean, alleging negligence and seeking compen-
sation for Spruiell's destroyed personal property and commercial
equipment. Under a reservation of right, Lincoln hired an attorney to
defend McKean.97
But, Lincoln also filed a declaratory judgment action. Both Mc-
Kean and Spruiell were listed as defendants in the complaint. The
question before the court was whether the liability insurer had a duty
to defend McKean in the underlying negligence action. The trial
judge's summary-judgment order stated that Lincoln had neither a
"duty to defend" nor a "duty to indemnify."98 Spruiell-the third-
party victim and the potential beneficiary of a damages award -ap-
pealed the adverse ruling. On appeal, Lincoln argued that Spruiell did
not have standing to challenge the trial court's declaration: Lincoln
had no contractual obligation to defend McKean. The Amarillo Court
of Appeals disagreed, citing Texas Supreme Court decisions. Briefly
put, the Texas Supreme Court has declared that liability-insurance
contracts give intended beneficiaries the right to participate in duty-
to-defend, declaratory-judgment trials.9 9
Addressing the duty-to-defend question, the appellate court applied
the "eight corners" doctrine. Spruiell's allegations did not contain
particular facts. Instead, his original petition alleged that McKean
"carelessly and negligently ... caused an explosion.""oo That simple
allegation was sufficient to bring the complaint within coverage under
94. No. 07-97-0336-CV, 1998 WL 174722 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Apr. 13, 1998, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication).
95. 16 S.W.3d at 418.
96. 962 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
97. Spruiell, 1998 WL 174722 at *1.
98. Id. at *1 n.1.
99. Id. at *1 ("[J]t is important to note that Lincoln named Spruiell as a party
defendant in its declaratory judgment suit. By suing Spruiell, Lincoln gave him stand-
ing to contest the judgment on appeal and, under the doctrine of invited error, Lin-
coln is now precluded from claiming that Spruiell lacks standing to challenge the
judgment. [Moreover], the [Texas] Supreme Court [has] suggested that injured third
parties may wish to participate in declaratory judgment actions involving the insurer's
duty to defend." (citing Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84
(Tex. 1997), and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.
1996))).
100. Id. at *2-3.
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the insurance contract. Therefore, the appellate court declared that
Lincoln had a duty to defend McKean. But, the Amarillo Court of
Appeals did not stop there. It also ruled in favor of Spruiell, conclud-
ing that "McKean's and Spruiell's rights [were] inextricably inter-
twined" under the liability insurance contract."o'
The Waco Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Mid-
Continent after performing a slightly different analysis. The relevant
facts are simple. Safe Tire Disposal Corporation ("Safe Tire") oper-
ates a business in Texas. An "accidental or unintended" fire ignited at
one of Safe Tire's facilities. The fire began in a wire pile. Although
the fire did not spread beyond piles of rubber chips, it produced thick
and black smoke, toxic and hazardous fumes as well as high levels of
noxious particulates. Many commercial and residential properties
were polluted. In addition, many people became ill. 10 2 Eventually,
claiming that Safe Tire was negligent, adjoining residents filed multi-
ple suits against the disposal company.10 3
Mid-Continent Casualty insured Safe Tire under a general com-
mercial liability insurance contract, which was in force during all rele-
vant periods. Safe Tire notified Mid-Continent in a timely manner
and asked Mid-Continent to defend it against the underlying lawsuits.
Mid-Continent refused. The liability insurer asserted that a pollution-
exclusion clause in the insurance contract precluded compensation for
the third parties' property damage and a legal defense against the law-
suits. 10 4 In response, Safe Tire filed a declaratory-judgment suit
against Mid-Continent. The trial court declared that Mid-Continent
had a duty to defend Safe Tire.05 The liability insurer appealed.
Before the Waco Court of Appeals, Mid-Continent insisted that the
policy excluded compensation if pollutants on Safer Tire's "owned or
occupied" premises escaped and caused third-party property damage
or bodily injuries.10 6 To counter, Safe Tire argued that the insurance
contract's "hostile fire exception" applied. More specifically, the in-
sured asserted that offensive heat, smoke, and fumes arose from a
hostile fire on its premises and caused the third parties' injuries and
property losses.107
The exception clause defined "a hostile fire [as] one which becomes
uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be."10 8
101. Id. at *3-4 (citing Kan. Univ. Endowment Ass'n. v. King, 350 S.W.2d 11, 19-20
(Tex. 1961), and Glover v. Henry, 749 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no
writ)).
102. Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418, 420 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 419.




Nevertheless, Mid-Continent argued: The hostile fire exception ap-
plied only if Safe Tire intentionally ignited a controlled fire, which be-
came uncontrollable or escaped.10 9 In the underlying third-party
complaint, the litigants alleged that a fire "broke out" on Safe Tire's
property."'o However, during the trial, probative evidence revealed
that the fire was "unintended.""' The Waco Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that Mid-Continent and Safe Tire's competing definitions
of a "hostile fire" were reasonable. In the end, the appellate court
applied the doctrine of ambiguity, concluded that a "hostile fire"
caused third-party damages, and declared that Mid-Continent had a
duty to defend.1 1 2
Unlike the insureds in Spruiell and Mid-Continent, the commercial
property owner in E & L Chipping had mixed results against its insur-
ers. E & L Chipping Company (E & L) sells lumber. One fateful day,
a fire occurred in a wood-chip pile on E & L's property. The company
tried to extinguish the fire by spraying large quantities of water on it.
Ultimately, the contaminated water left the site and polluted sur-
rounding landowners' land, lakes, springs, and underground water sys-
tems.113 As a consequence, third-party complainants filed four
negligence and statutory-based lawsuits against E&L.1 14
When the fire-related pollution occurred, St. Paul Insurance Com-
pany as well as the Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover) insured
E&L's property against fire. 1 Yet, the insurers refused to defend
E&L against the lawsuits.11 6 E&L commenced breach-of-contract ac-
tions against the insurers. St. Paul and Hanover filed motions for
summary judgment. The trial judge granted both without explana-
tions."' E&L appealed the rulings to the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals. After applying the "eight corners" doctrine, the appellate court
declared that St. Paul's summary-judgment award was erroneous. St.





112. Id. (citing Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex.
1997) (declaring that an ambiguous exclusion clause must be interpreted in favor of
the insured if two or more reasonable interpretations exist)).
113. E & L Chipping Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
114. Id. at 276-77.
115. Id. at 275.
116. Id. at 274 ("[B]oth insurers . . . denied coverage and refused to tender a de-
fense. E & L claims it was forced to incur over $500,000 in legal expenses in the
underlying lawsuits, which E & L successfully defended.").
117. Id. at 274.
118. Id. at 275-76 ("St. Paul's policy covers 'property damage' occurring during the
policy period. The policy does not require that an occurrence take place during the
policy period. . . . [However] the property damage must be caused by an occurrence,
which [the policy defines as] . . . 'an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
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On the other hand, the appellate court upheld Hanover's summary-
judgment award. In one of the underlying lawsuits, the claimant al-
leged "that polluted fire water and other contaminated waters from
E&L's property seeped into the ground water and contaminated the
lake on her property."1 19 According to E & L, that allegation quali-
fies as a "hostile fire" exception under the property insurance con-
tract's pollution-exclusion clause.1 20 The Beaumont Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed citing two reasons: (1) The third-party
complaint alleged that contaminated water-rather than heat, smoke,
or fumes-was the efficient proximate cause of the property damage;
and, (2) the cause in fact was liquid pollution, rather than hostile-fire
generated smoke, fumes, or heat.1 21 Thus, in the end, the appellate
court concluded: "[T]he absolute pollution exclusion ... applies and
precludes coverage or a duty to defend [against the underly-
ing suit]." 1 2 2 Of course, other appellate courts in Texas have ruled
that property insurers do not have a duty to defend insureds against
third-party, fire-loss suits.1 23
V. PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS To HARMONIZE CONFLICTING
DUTY-TO-INDEMNIFY RULINGS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS' DISPOSITION OF FIRE- AND PROPERTY-
Loss ACTIONS AGAINST INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1884-2012
Certainly, discovering that courts of appeals are issuing conflicting
fire-loss and insurance-compensation decisions is not just an interest-
ing empirical finding. But the analysis does not and should not end
with that important finding. Highly competent, experienced, and pru-
dent plaintiffs' and insurance-defense lawyers weigh such judicial con-
sure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.' . . . The policy specifically
states that St. Paul has a duty to defend 'any suit seeking those damages.' . . . In
looking at the 'eight corners' of the insurance policy and the underlying pleadings, it is
apparent the facts pleaded are within the scope of the policy period. . . . The trial
court erred[.]").
119. Id. at 277.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 277-78.
122. Id. at 278.
123. See, e.g., In re Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 01-09-00851-CV,
2010 WL 184300, at *1-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 15, 2010, no pet.)
(mem. op.) ("Starla Bauer sued Parker for damages caused by a grass fire. . . .
Parker's insurance company [defended Parker] . . . subject to a reservation of rights.
Lloyds then petitioned for a declaratory judgment . . . seeking a declaratory judgment
that Lloyds owed no duty to defend or indemnify . . . . Parker answered the lawsuit,
but filed no affirmative claims for relief.... Lloyds moved for summary judgment ....
[T]he trial court signed an order granting Lloyds' motion.... The trial court entered
the judgment . . . as a final judgment. . . . Over a year and three months after the trial
court's [order] . . . , Parker moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment and
moved for his own summary judgment. The dispute ... is whether the trial court's ...
order was a final judgment. . . . We hold that the record supports the trial court's
stated intent hat the . . . order be a final judgment.") (emphasis added).
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flicts extremely carefully before deciding to settle claims or litigate.
Therefore, determining why property insurers and fire-loss victims are
more or less likely to win duty-to-indemnify disputes in certain appel-
late courts must be the next inquiry. Are some judges or venues more
likely to be "biased" in favor of insurance companies? Do other
courts have a "strong propensity" to favor insureds? There is evi-
dence in the literature, suggesting that "judicial bias" exists and colors
judges' substantive and procedural rulings.1 24 Also, the Author has
published articles documenting that appellate-court judges allow ex-
tralegal factors to shape significantly both insureds and insurers' likeli-
hoods of winning procedurally and on the merits.1 2 5
Therefore, considering that wildfire-compensation litigation is likely
to increase considerably between insurers and property owners in
Texas, the Author decided to conduct an empirical study. The investi-
gation was designed to determine whether extralegal factors have af-
fected systematically the disposition of fire-loss claims in appellate
courts within and beyond Texas.
A. Data Sources and Sampling Procedures
The hypothesis in this study is: no statistically significant difference
exists between insurers and fire-loss victims' likelihoods of winning
duty-to-indemnify actions in state and federal courts. The Author em-
ployed a multi-pronged methodology to build the database.
First, WESTLAw and LEXIs data-retrieval systems were used to lo-
cate every reported fire and insurance-related duty-to-indemnify law-
suit that had reached or terminated in a court of appeals. Second, if
the electronically reported cases cited other unreported fire-loss cases,
the Author canvassed regional reporters to locate those latter cases.
Those efforts generated 364 duty-to-indemnify, fire-loss lawsuits be-
tween insurers and insured property owners (loss-from-fire disputes).
Third, the Author also wanted and needed to secure a representative
sample of property-loss, duty-to-indemnify lawsuits, which involved
property losses from causes other than fires.1 2 6 Therefore, the Author
took a proportional-stratified-random sample of all "other" duty-to-
indemnify cases that had been decided procedurally or on the mer-
124. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90-91 nn. 58, 103, 111-12 (2008) (presenting a
fairly comprehensive history and description of Professor Rice's published content-
analysis studies and theoretical analyses of various common-law and statutory
questions).
125. See, e.g., id.
126. The Author and his research assistants searched Westlaw's MIN-CS, ALL-
STATES, ALLFEDS, CTA and DCT databases between November 2011 and Febru-
ary 2012. In addition, the investigators searched various regional reporters as well as
LEXIS's Genfed Library and COURTS File, during the same period.
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its.127 The latter effort produced 397 cases (loss-from-other-perils dis-
putes). The dates of the cases range from 1884 to 2012.128 Finally, to
test the study's hypothesis, the Author performed a content analysis of
each case.1 2 9 There are 761 cases in the study.
B. Background Characteristics of Fire-Loss, Duty-to-Indemnify
Litigants in State and Federal Courts between 1884-2012
TABLE 1 presents frequencies and percentages, illustrating the dis-
position of insurance-compensation disputes.
The first variable in the table is entitled, JURISDICTIONS. It reveals
that loss-from-fire disputes are more likely to be litigated in state
courts, while loss-from-other-perils lawsuits are more likely to be re-
solved in federal courts-87.5% and 58.2%, respectively. The varia-
ble-TYPES OF COURTS-gives greater details of the courts, which
ultimately decided the cases. Briefly, among the loss-from-fire dis-
putes, Texas's courts decided 34.9% of the controversies. Other state
courts decided 52.7% and various federal circuits decided 12.4%. On
the other hand, the Fifth Circuit and other federal courts of appeals
decided most of the loss-from-other-perils disputes. The percentages
are 12.9% and 45.3%, respectively.
The third variable in TABLE 1 is INSUREDS & COMPLAINANTS. It
describes first- and third-party victims and property owners who com-
menced various lawsuits against indemnity and liability insurers. As
illustrated, stark differences exist between loss-from-fire and loss-
from-other-perils plaintiffs. Overwhelmingly, loss-from-fire victims
are significantly more likely to be homeowners and small businesses -
56.9% and 18.1%, respectively. In contrast, corporations and assign-
127. See Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of the
Effectiveness of Bapcpa (And Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 135, 138 (2007) ("Using a proportional, stratified, random sample of bankruptcy
cases from [two twelve-month periods to create a] . . . database of cases for every state
in the Tenth Circuit.").
128. The Author used the following queries to locate cases in the corresponding
electronic databases:
1) QUERY-(FIRE! /3 (PROPERTY HOME HOUSE BUSINESS /4
DAMAGE LOSS))-(Westlaw's TXIN-CS database, last visited on Janu-
ary 12, 2012);
2) QUERY-((FIRE! /P WINDS HILLS CANYON FOREST) % EM-
PLOY! HIRE! )-Westlaw's MIN-CS database, last visited on February
2, 2012);
3) QUERY-(FIRE! /P WINDS HILLS CANYON)-Westlaw's CAIN-CS
database, last visited on December 4, 2011); and
4) QUERY-(INSURANCE INSURED /P WILDFIRE "BRUSH FIRE"
"FOREST FIRE" "GRASS FIRE")-Westlaw's ALLFEDS database,
last visited on November 23, 2011).
129. See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 567, 588-95 (1991) (performing a content analysis to examine Jus-
tices' opinions).
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ees were substantially more likely to sue insurers who refused to cover
those complainants' non-fire-related property losses. The percentages
are 66.5% and 9.6%, respectively.
Now, consider the complainants' theories of recovery. Among both
loss-from-fire and loss-from-other-perils cases, extremely large num-
bers of complainants filed breach-of-contract actions. The corre-
sponding percentages are 90.3% and 97.2%, respectively. But, among
the loss-from-fire cases, the litigants also filed a fairly large number of
declaratory-judgment actions (39.6%).
TABLE 2 presents procedural and final dispositions of duty-to-in-
demnify actions in state and federal courts.
The first half of TABLE 2 shows the procedural dispositions of the
actions among both loss-from-fire and loss-from-other-perils cases.
Generally, the percentages indicate that trial and appellate courts are
significantly more likely to decide duty-to-indemnify controversies
based on the merits rather than procedurally. For example, among
the loss-from-fire actions, trial and courts of appeals decided 93.1%
and 86.8% of the disputes on the merits, respectively. Among the
loss-from-other-perils cases, the respective percentages for trial and
appellate courts are 97.2% and 87.4%.
In the bottom half of TABLE 2, the remaining numbers and percent-
ages illustrate complainants and insurers' win/loss ratios among loss-
from-fire and loss-from-other-perils cases. First, consider the variable
OUTCOME-TRIAL COURTS. Among the loss-from-fire conflicts, the re-
sults indicate that first- and third-party complainants are more likely
to win duty-to-indemnify actions in trial courts-56.9% versus 43.1%.
Alternatively, among loss-from-other-perils cases, insurers are more
likely to win in trial courts-59.5% versus 40.5%.
However, on appeal, complainants' likelihood of prevailing im-
proved appreciably regardless of the types of claims filed against in-
surers. Among the loss-from-other-perils disputes, plaintiffs and
insurers won nearly equal numbers of cases-50.7% versus 49.3%.
For plaintiffs, that was a 10.2% improvement in the courts of appeals.
In addition, on appeal, plaintiffs won an impressive 58.3% of the fire-
related, property-loss lawsuits.
C. Bivariate Relationships between Litigants' Characteristics and the
Disposition of Duty-to-Indemnify, Fire-Loss Actions in
Courts of Appeals
Again, the percentages in the previous section present a description
of litigants' demographic characteristics and win/loss ratios. Gener-
ally, if fire destroyed insured's or third parties' properties, those com-
plainants are more likely to win duty-to-indemnify lawsuits. So, it is
fair to ask: Are property insurers losing significantly more often be-
cause appellate courts are more likely to be intentionally biased
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against insurers? Quite candidly, the present data and statistical anal-
ysis cannot answer that question. On the other hand, TABLE 3
presents the types of legal and extralegal factors that courts of appeals
weigh wittingly or unwittingly when deciding whether to decide in
favor of property-loss victims or insurers.
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TABLE 1. FIRE-RELATED AND OTHER PROPERTY-Loss LAWSUITS:
SOME SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLAINANTS WHO FILED
DUTY-TO-INDEMNIFY ACTIONS AGAINST PROPERTY INSURERS,
1884-2012 (N = 761)
CHARACTERISTICS FIRE-RELATED PROPERTY-Loss OTHER PROPERTY-Loss
LAWSUITS (N = 364) Lawsuits (N = 397)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Jurisdictions:
State Lawsuits 319 87.6* 166 41.8
Federal Lawsuits 45 12.4 231 58.2*
Types of Courts:
Texas Courts 127 34.9* 5 1.3
Fifth Circuit 6 1.7 51 12.9
Other Circuits 39 10.7 180 45.3*
Other State Courts 192 52.7* 161 40.5
Insureds &
Complainants:
Homeowners 207 56.9**** 25 6.3
Small Businesses 66 18.1**** 22 5.5
Corporations 32 8.8 264 66.5****
Partnerships 15 4.1 7 1.8
Banks 12 3.3 10 2.5
Landowners 11 3.0 6 1.5
Agents 11 3.0 6 1.5
Assignees/Third Parties 10 2.8 38 9.6****
Professions - - 11 2.8
Educational Institutions - 8 2.0
'Theories of Recovery:
Breach of Contract 329 90.3*** 386 97.2***
Common-Law "Bad 28 7.7 21 5.3
Faith"




No Insurable Interest 38 10.4
No Coverage 38 10.4 155 39.0**
Misrepresentation of 30 8.2 7 1.8
Material Facts
Insured's Conduct was 116 32.0** 37 9.3
Intentional
Insured Beached a 63 17.3** 26 6.6
Condition
No Efficient Proximate 11 5.5 5 1.3
Cause of Loss
Other Defenses & 59 16.2 167 42.0**
General Denials
'The sums of these columns exceed unity (100%), since multiple theories of recovery
appeared in many complaints.
Levels of statistical significance:
**** Spearman's rank test:rho = .56 p .0001
*** Spearman's rank test:rho = .45 p .0001
** Spearman's rank test:rho = .22 p .03
* Chi Square statistic 94.00, df 1 p .0001
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TABLE 2. THE PROCEDURAL AND FINAL DISPOSITIONS OF FIRE-
RELATED AND OTHER COVERED-PERILs DUTY-TO-
INDEMNIFY LAWSUITs AGAINST PROPERTY
INSURERS, 1884-2012 (N = 761)
CHARACTERISTICS FIRE-RELATED PROPERTY-Loss OTHER PROPERTY-Loss
LAWSUITS (N = 364) Lawsuits (N = 397)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Disposition - Trial
Courts:
Procedural 25 6.9 11 2.8
Merits 339 93.1 386 97.2
Disposition - Appeals
Courts:
Procedural 17 4.7 8 2.0
Merits 316 86.8 347 87.4
No Appeals 31 8.5 42 10.6
Outcomes - Trial
Courts:
Complainants Won 207 56.9 *** 161 40.5




Complainants Won 194 58.3 ** 175 50.7
Insurers Won 139 41.7 180 49.3 **
Levels of statistical significance:
*** Chi square statistic = 20.237, df = 1, p < .0001
** Chi square statistic = 5.550, df = 1, p .01
TABLE 3 presents two categories of cases-Texas Courts of Ap-
peals' cases and cases decided in the Fifth Circuit and other courts of
appeals. In addition, the table illustrates the individual effects of vari-
ous predictors on litigants' likelihood of winning or losing duty-to-in-
demnify lawsuits (OUTCOME). The reported percentages reveal
outcomes from the perspectives of property owners and other inter-
ested persons who sued insurers. TYPES OF PLAINTIFFS is the first cat-
egory of predictors. In Texas's appellate courts, complainants in every
category won a significant majority of the lawsuits. The average per-
centage across the four categories of complainants is 61.4%.
However, among cases decided in the Fifth Circuit and in other ap-
pellate courts, corporations/partnerships as well as assignees/third par-
ties were more likely to lose. The corresponding percentages are
59.5% and 57.1%, respectively. On the other hand, small-business
owners and homeowners/landowners were significantly more likely to
win in the Fifth Circuit and in other courts of appeals. Those percent-
ages are 53.6% and 62.0%, respectively.
In courts of appeals beyond Texas, types of fire losses influenced
the disposition of cases. More specifically, property owners were
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commercial-property losses. But, in the Fifth Circuit and other appel-
late courts, disgruntled residential-property owners are appreciably
more likely to prevail (62.0%) against insurers. Among cases decided
in Texas appellate courts, types of ire losses have no statistically sig-
nificant effect on the disposition of cases. Property owners won the
majority of suits in Texas courts, regardless of whether insurers re-
jected the owners' commercial or residential fire-loss claims. The per-
centages are 60.4% and 63.5%, respectively.
Arguably, the bivariate relationships between outcomes and insur-
ers' affirmative defenses and general denials are the most legally and
statistically significant findings in TABLE 3. Consider the predominant
affirmative defenses that insurers raised in Texas's and in other courts
of appeals: (1) First or third-party complainants have no insurable in-
terest in the destroyed propertyl3 0 ; (2) The complainants' residential
and commercial properties are not covered under the insurance con-
tract;13 1 (3) The insured's intentional conduct rather than a fire was
the efficient proximate cause of the destroyed property;13 2 (4) The in-
sured's misrepresentation of a material fact precludes insurance com-
pensation;133 and (5) Indemnification is precluded because the
insured breached a condition in the insurance application or
contract.13 4
A careful inspection of the percentages reveals: Only some affirma-
tive defenses are ffective in Texas's appellate courts. Still, other de-
fenses are effective only before the Fifth Circuit and in other states'
courts of appeals. For example, complainants won 76.7% of the rul-
ings in Texas's appellate courts, when insurers raised the no-insurable-
interest defense. Contrarily, insurers won 57.1% of the decisions in
other appellate courts when raising the same defense. Of course, one
should not attach too much significance to the latter percentage be-
cause it is based on just seven cases. But consider these findings: In
Texas's courts of appeal, first- and third-party plaintiffs prevailed in
65.8% of the cases, when property insurance companies proffered a
breach-of-condition defense. In contrast, insurers prevailed 54.6% of
130. See Smith v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1963) (requiring an
insurable interest in a property as a perquisite before purchasing insurance).
131. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
132. See Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 996 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1999) (forcing
the property insurer to compensate the innocent spouse but allowing the insurer to
withhold compensation for the deviant spouse who intentionally destroyed commu-
nity property).
133. See Haney v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1974) (re-
quiring the insurer to prove that the insured made a material misrepresentation "will-
fully and with design to deceive or defraud" before withholding insurance
compensation).
134. Cf Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 202 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1947, no writ) ("[U]nless a breach ... of a condition [in] ... a fire insurance
policy causes or contributes to . . . the destruction of the property, such breach . . . will
not render void the policy or constitute a defense to a suit[.]").
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the time when the breach-of-condition defense was advanced before
the Fifth Circuit and in other courts of appeals.
D. Two-Stage Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Interrelationships
between Litigants' Attributes and the Disposition of Duty-
to-Indemnify Actions in State and Federal Courts
of Appeals
Perhaps, the statistically significant findings in TABLE 3 offer a plau-
sible explanation of appellate courts' propensity to issue conflicting
decisions, when the probative facts surrounding duty-to-indemnify
disputes are fairly to extremely similar. As reported, in Texas's appel-
late courts, fire-loss victims are more likely to prevail if judges weigh
and reject a defined set of affirmative defenses. On the other hand,
insurers are more likely to prevail when appellate courts beyond
Texas weigh and accept an identical set of affirmative defenses. Cer-
tainly, without knowing more, the disparities between Texas and other
appellate courts' duty-to-indemnity rulings should not raise any legal
concerns.
But again, TABLE 3 presents only simple, bivariate associations be-
tween win/loss outcomes and a few categorical variables. The goal,
however, is to determine whether appellate court's geographic loca-
tions or other factors truly explain those disparities. Therefore, to
help approximate that end, one should employ a more powerful statis-
tical procedure, which allows an investigator to measure the unique as
well as the simultaneous effects of multiple legal and extralegal vari-
ables on appellate courts' disposition of duty-to-indemnify controver-
sies. Thus, to help increase the likelihood of achieving that goal, the
Author employed a multivariate, two-staged probit procedure.1 3 5
TABLE 4 presents the results of conducting a multivariate-probit
analysis of the disposition of duty-to-indemnify, insurance disputes in
Texas's and other courts of appeals.
135. In several published law-review articles, the Author discussed and used this
statistical procedure to measure simultaneously individual and multiple effects of in-
dependent variables on the disposition of court decisions. In a nutshell, the procedure
determines the specific individual, statistical effects ("explanations") of certain vari-
ables on, say, appellate courts' dispositions of duty-to-indemnify cases, while control-
ling for and determining the multiple and simultaneous effects of other "presumed"
random factors. See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, Allegedly "Biased," "Intimidating," and "In-
competent" State-Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State-Law Class Ac-
tions to Purportedly "Impartial" and "Competent" Federal Courts: A Historical
Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of Class-Action Dispositions in Federal & State
Courts, 1925-2011, 3 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 2, 127-129 n.787 (April 2012) (list-
ing publications and page numbers on which a multivariate probit analyses were dis-
cussed and computed). The Author used StataCorp's Stata Statistical Software to
analyze the data generally and to compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in
particular.
Once more, it is important to note: The findings in TABLE 4 are based
on an analysis of 761 cases. The sample includes 364 fire-loss lawsuits.
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Of this latter number, litigants appealed 333 duty-to-indemnify deci-
sions to federal and state appellate courts; and they decided not to
appeal 31 actions. The remaining 397 cases involve disputes over
whether insurers must compensate property owners or interested per-
sons for other-perils-related losses. Those cases were also decided in
state and federal lower courts. And, of this group of cases, property
owners and insurers decided to appeal nearly ninety percent (89.4%)
to appellate courts. The remaining ten percent (10.6%) were not
appealed.
To be sure, one cannot overlook cavalierly the finding that some
litigants appealed, while others did not. Briefly put, the "nonap-
pealers" were "unobserved" in the courts of appeals. Thus, their ab-
sence could be a source of "selectivity bias" when attempting to
explain litigants' likelihood or winning/losing in courts of appeals.
Elsewhere, in published law-review articles, the Author has addressed
questions about the quality of sample data-whether the cases ap-
pearing in law reporters or electronic databases actually reflect what is
occurring in courts factually.13 6 Thus, testing for "selectivity bias" in
the present sample data is necessary and the more advanced statistical
procedure discussed here performs that test.137
In light of those preliminary remarks, reconsider TABLE 4 and re-
view the nine (9) "dummy" or zero/one variables.1 38 Each has been
categorized under one of four general headings. In addition, the table
contains eight (8) distributions of probit coefficients and other statis-
tics. The first four (4) distributions on the left illustrate the statisti-
cally significant predictors which influenced insurers and fire-loss
victims' decision to appeal trial and district courts' adverse rulings and
judgments. Although those findings are relevant, they are not the fo-
cus of our attention here. Instead, the goal is to determine which of
the nine variables "caused" appellate courts to decide insurance-com-
pensation disputes in favor of or against insured property owners and
insurers.
To begin the analysis, consider the three variables under the head-
ing, TYPES OF COMPLAINANTS. Now, consider the four (4) distribu-
tions of statistics on the right-probit coefficients, corresponding
136. See Rice, supra note 35 at 1208-09 (discussing the inherent problems with us-
ing just reported cases and simple percentages to make inferences. To be sure, there
are "full" judicial decisions, which are not published in various federal and state re-
porters. However, to address that limitation in part, the present study includes both
cases appearing in the reporters as well as in multiple online state and federal
databases).
137. In several published articles, the Author discussed "selectivity bias" problems
and the test to determine its presence or absence in sample data. See, e.g., Rice, supra
note 135, at 128-34 nn.266, 783.
138. See Jan Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations
and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 109, 125-30 (1995) (explaining and mea-
suring the statistical effects of "dummy" variables-zeros and ones-on sellers' and
buyers' decisions and bargaining outcomes).
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robust standard errors, z-statistics and the coefficients' levels of statis-
tical significance.1 39 Also note: The first three probit coefficients-
.2642, .2418, and .2346 -are positive. Even more importantly, they
are statistically significant. Those findings mean: When property insur-
ers reject banks, partnerships, and small-businesses' commercial fire-
loss claims and duty-to-indemnify lawsuits are filed, those entities are
substantially more likely to prevail against insurers in all state and
federal appellate courts.
The "Wildfires-Prescribed Burns" variable under the next head-
ing-TYPES OF FIRES CAUSING PROPERTY DAMAGE AND PERSONAL
INJURIES - has a corresponding positive and statistically significant
probit coefficient (.5044). It means that "commercial fire-loss" com-
plainants are substantially more likely to prevail in all state and fed-
eral courts of appeals, if (1) out-of-control prescribed burns destroy
first- and third-party victims' properties, and (2) insurance companies
reject those claims. In contrast, the "Wildfires-Forest Fires" variable
almost has a statistically significant effect on the distribution of duty-
to-indemnify cases. But, the probit coefficient is negative (-.3313).
The coefficient suggests that "commercial fire-loss" victims are sub-
stantially less likely to prevail in state and federal courts of appeals, if
(1) spreading forest fires destroy victims' properties, and (2) insurers
refuse to compensate the victims.
The remaining two statistically significant findings in Table 4 lend
credence to the latter interpretation. Consider the PLAINTIFFS' THEO-
RIES OF RECOVERY. Breach-of-contract actions produce no statisti-
cally meaningful effect on the disposition of cases. However, property
owners and third parties are significantly more likely to lose (-.1437),
if (1) insurers reject "commercial-fire loss" claims, and (2) plaintiffs
seek equitable relief in a declaratory-judgment rial. The second rele-
vant finding appears under the heading, PROPERTY INSURERS' AF-
FIRMATIVE DEFENSES & GENERAL DENIALS. The negative probit
coefficient (-.1945) means: "Commercial fire-loss" victims are substan-
tially less likely to win if insurers prove that insured property owners
"materially" breach a condition in an insurance application or
contract.
In light of the statistically significant findings, we still must answer
an equally important question: Whether "selectivity bias" appears in
the data. Or put differently, is there any meaningful difference be-
139. See, e.g., Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Ef-
fects of the Repatriation Provision of the AICA, 5 NW. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, at 22
nn.34-35 (2010) ("Columns of the table represent separate regressions, and rows of
the table represent variables corresponding to coefficients computed in the regres-
sions. . . . The value reported for each regression and variable is the point estimate of
the coefficient, and the value [to the right] is the robust standard error estimate. . . . In
reports of regression results in this Article . . . the notations *, **, and *** are used to
indicate statistical significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. These
values are computed using the robust standard errors described in [note 34].").
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tween litigants who decided to appeal adverse duty-to-indemnity deci-
sions and those litigants who decided not to appeal. Unavoidably, this
requires a researcher to "test" for similarities between two equa-
tions-the two distributions of probit coefficients. At the bottom of
TABLE 4, a Wald test for independent equations suggests that no
meaningful "selectivity bias" exists. The corresponding Chi square
statistic is not statistically significant. Therefore, in light of no appar-
ent "self-selection bias," we may conclude: Some of the nine
predictors' simultaneous and multiple ffects are significantly more or
less likely to influence the dispositions of insurance-related, duty-to-
indemnify disputes in courts of appeals.
VI. SUMMARY-CONCLUSION
As reported earlier, when Hurricanes Rita and Carla destroyed
commercial and residential property in Texas, property insurers' ad-
justers rushed to the scenes of the destruction and delivered checks to
affected businesses and homeowners. In the wake of Tropical Storms
Allison, Bill, and Frances, other insurance adjusters dashed to de-
stroyed properties and wrote checks. Definitely, most residential and
commercial property owners accepted the insurance compensation,
even though it was insufficient to repair or replace partially or com-
pletely destroyed properties.
Conversely, many residential and commercial property owners sued
major insurers to collect funds to cover "additional living expenses."
Some tropical-storm victims sued insurers in Texas courts, because the
insurers refused to cover totally destroyed properties' replacement
costs. In addition, some mortgagees, tenants and assignees-who had
insurable interests in destroyed properties-sued property insurers for
failing to indemnify.1 40 As discussed above, some of those cases have
been resolved. But other disputes are still working their way through
state and federal courts.
A canvass of hurricane-related and tropical-storms cases reveals
that plaintiffs' and insurance-defense attorneys review carefully the
disposition of insurance-related, compensation disputes. Today, the
same level of attention is warranted because similar duty-to-indemnify
controversies are likely to arise substantially in the wake of the mas-
sive wildfires-related losses in Texas. But even more importantly, vic-
tims of wildfires should be concerned. Again, the present study
140. See, e.g., Hull v. Loe's Highport, Inc., No. 05-91-01019-CV, 1992 WL 193490,
at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 13, 1992, no writ.) ("David Hull & Associates d/b/a
Waterfront Restaurants . . . appeals a summary judgment . . . and severance order
granted in favor of Loe's Highport . . . in a suit to obtain a judicial declaration [of] the
parties' rights to insurance proceeds. The trial court granted . . . [the sole rights of the
insurance proceeds to Loe as reimbursement for damage to] the restaurant buildings
resulting from a flood . . . . Hull contends that . . . he had an insurable interest in the
property[.]").
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uncovered some debatably unsettling findings: Commercial and resi-
dential property owners are substantially more likely to "win" or
"lose" when appellate courts allow arguably impermissible or extrale-
gal variables to intentionally or unintentionally influence the disposi-
tion of duty-to-indemnify lawsuits.
To repeat, complainants are likely to "win" duty-to-indemnify dis-
putes procedurally or on the merits based on who they are. Insurers
are more likely to "win" or "lose" duty-to-indemnify disputes depend-
ing on whether grass, brush, prescribed, forest or out-of-controlled
prairie fires destroyed the insureds' residential or commercial proper-
ties. Arguably, members of plaintiffs' and insurance-defense bars in
Texas and the Fifth Circuit-who can appreciate the gravity of the
judicial conflicts and empirical finding discussed in this essay-will in-
crease the likelihood of their clients' prevailing in lawsuits involving
wildfires, destroyed residential and commercial properties and insur-
ance compensation.
